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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
v. 
GEORGE RAY NEELEY and 
LYNN L. BELT, : Case Nos . 20694 and 20710 
Defendants/Appellants. : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from convictions and judgments 
against George Ray Neeley and Lynn L. Belt for one count each 
of Criminal Trespass, an infraction, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated, §76-6-206 (1953 as amended); one count each of 
Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated, §76-6-202 (1953 as amended); and one count each of 
Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated, §76-6-404 (1953 as amended). A jury found them 
guilty following a trial which occurred on April 4th, 5th, 9th 
and 10th, 1985, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
Judge, presiding. On May 13th, 1985, Mr. Belt and Mr. Neeley 
were each sentenced by the same court to a term of incarceration 
of three months for the criminal trespass (sic), a term of 
incarceration from zero to five years for the burglary, and a 
term of incarceration from one to fifteen years for the theft, 
all terms to run concurrently. (R. 281-285) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Should the trial judge have recused himself 
because he had prosecuted one of the appellants prior to his 
becoming a judge? 
II. Should the case have been remanded back to the 
circuit court because a recording malfunction prevented tran-
scription of the preliminary hearing? 
III. Did the trial court err by refusing to instruct 
the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass? 
IV. Did the trial court err by refusing to give a 
cautionary instruction regarding accomplice testimony? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 11, 1983, the Appellants, George Ray Neeley-
and Lynn L. Belt, were arrested leaving Spectra Symbol Corpora-
tion at 2534 Directors Row in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 383) 
A third person, David Bittner, was also apprehended at the same 
time but was not charged with any crime. (R. 383) Mr. Neeley 
and Mr. Belt were each charged with one count of burglary and 
one count of theft arising from this April incident. (R. 29) 
In addition, each was charged with two other counts of burglary 
supposedly occurring at the same business on March 19th and 
20th, 1983. (R. 29-30) At the preliminary hearing, the March 
19th charge was dismissed, the March 20th burglary charge was 
reduced to a class C misdemeanor (criminal trespass), and 
Appellants were bound over to stand trial on that misdemeanor 
and the April 11th felony charges. (R. 6, 29-30) 
Defense counsel filed a pre-trial motion requesting 
that the trial judge, Jay E. Banks, recuse himself. This motion 
was based on the fact that the trial judge had previously been 
the prosecuting attorney in four different cases against Appel-
lant Lynn Belt between 1964 and 1970. (R. 87-88) Judge Banks 
referred the motion to Judge Dean Conder, of the Third Judicial 
District Court, to determine it sufficiency. (R. 88) Judge 
Conder denied the motion without hearing. (R. 85) Trial on 
this matter was delayed for several months. Defense counsel 
renewed the motion to recuse a few days before trial by filing 
an Amended Affidavit. (R. 141-143, 134-140) Judge Banks found 
this affidavit to contain insufficient bases for recusal but 
referred the matter to Judge Phillip Fishier, of the Third 
Judicial District Court. (R. 143) Judge Fishier conducted a 
hearing on the recusal motion at the close of which he indicated, 
"My thinking would be if I could check around the district 
court and see if we could find a judge who could just trade 
calendars with Judge Banks". (R. 901) Despite this statement, 
Judge Fishier later denied the motion by minute entry. (R. 
133) 
Defense counsel also filed a pre-trial motion to 
remand the case to the circuit court for another preliminary 
hearing. This motion was filed because a malfunction in the 
recording equipment during the preliminary hearing prevented 
appellants from receiving a complete copy of the transcript of 
that proceeding. (R. 89-90) This motion was denied by Judge 
Banks. (R. 146) 
At trial, the primary witness against appellants was 
David Bittner. Bittner was an employee of Spectra Symbol. (R. 
344) He testified that he accompanied Mr. Neeley and Mr. Belt 
to Spectra Symbol late at night on March 19th, 1983, at which 
time all three entered the building and a small amount of silver 
used by the business was taken. (R. 348-358) Bittner further 
testified that the three returned to Spectra Symbol late on the 
evening of April 11th, 1983. Bittner stated that the object of 
this visit was to take a large quantity of silver. (R. 384-85) 
Bittner, who had been granted immunity by the County Attorney's 
Office, testified that this plan was foiled because he had 
reported the earlier entrance into the business to his employer 
and to the police. (R. 361-62) Bittner1s testimony also 
revealed: that he had previously been convicted of felonies 
and was on parole at the time of these incidents (R. 343-344); 
that he was using drugs at the time of these incidents in 
violation of his parole agreement (R. 450); that he had been 
paid by the police for his involvement in this incident (R. 
363, 406-410); and that he had perjured himself during the 
preliminary hearing in the matter (R. 384, 398, 405-406). 
Both appellants testified in their own behalf and 
their testimony directly contradicted that of Bittner. Both 
appellants testified that they were at Spectra Symbol only 
once, on April 11th, 1983. (R. 729, 785) They further testified 
that they went to the business that night at Bittner1s request 
to help him retrieve and dispose of some marijuana in his locker 
at the business, because he was expecting his parole agent to 
search the locker. (R. 721, 730-731/ 736f 796) Finally, 
appellants testified that Bittner told them that he had authority 
to be in the business at any timef day or night. (R. 726, 731, 
779, 780) 
Because of Bittner1s involvement in the alleged 
crimes/ defense counsel requested that an accomplice instruction 
be given to the jury. (R. 185) This instruction would have 
cautioned the jury concerning the perils of the testimony of an 
accomplice. The requested instruction was denied. (R. 185, 
879) Finally/ defense counsel also requested instructions on 
the lesser included offense of criminal trespass with respect 
to the April 11th incident. (R. 169-172/ 194f 227f 880-882) 
Those instructions were also denied. 
Appellants were convicted of one count each of criminal 
trespass, an infraction/ burglary, and theft. From those 
convictions, this appeal is taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The first argument presented on appeal is that the 
trial judge should have been recused from this case because he 
had previously prosecuted one of the appellants. A biased 
judge should not preside at trial. Even the appearance of bias 
should be avoided. In order to avoid the appearance of bias, 
the trial judge should have been recused/ either on his own 
initiative or by another district court Judge. 
Appellants next contend that the case should have 
been remanded to the circuit court for another preliminary 
hearing since an equipment malfunction prevented recording of 
the original preliminary hearing. Courts have generally held 
that reversible error is committed when a defendant is denied a 
preliminary hearing transcript if the denial results in prejudice 
to the defendant. In this case, the denial was prejudicial 
because appellants did not have access to the preliminary 
hearing testimony of accomplice David Bittner, who admitted 
that he perjured himself at that hearing. 
In the third issue presented, appellants claim that 
the trial court committed error in refusing to give a jury 
instruction on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass. 
Some of the evidence adduced at trial could reasonably have 
been relied on by the jury to acquit appellants of the 
greater charge and convict them of the lesser charge. However, 
since no instruction concerning a lesser charge was given, the 
jury was not given this option. 
Finally, appellants submit that the trial court 
should have given a requested instruction concerning accomplice 
testimony. Such an instruction is required if the accomplice 
testimony is self-contradictory. In this case, the accomplice 
admitted at trial that he had perjured himself at the preliminary 
hearinq. This obvious self-contradiction in the testimony 
mandated the need for a cautionary instruction reqardinq accom-
plice testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO RECUSE HIMSELF AT 
TRIAL. 
The courts have generally ruled that a biased judge 
should not sit at trial. This rule was well-stated by the 
Supreme Court of Colorado: "Courts must meticulously avoid any 
appearance of partiality...to retain public respect and secure 
willing and ready obedience to their judgments." People v. 
District Court, 192 Colo. 503, 560 P.2d 826 (1977), quoting 
Nordloh v. Packard, 45 Colo. 515, 101 P.787 (1909). 
Consistent with this rule was the then-existing Article 
VIII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution which provided for 
the disqualification of the trial judge when the judge "may 
have been of counsel" at an earlier date. (See Addendum A) 
The same protection against biased judges is also 
recognized in Utah's Code of Criminal Procedure. Utah Code 
Annotated, §77-35-29(c), Rule 29 (1982). (See Addendum B) The 
bias may be either against a party or in favor of either party. 
The rule requires the judge to proceed no further once an 
affidavit alleging bias or prejudice is filed. Another judge 
must either try the case or conduct a recusal hearing. In the 
instant case, in a pretrial motion, defense counsel requested 
that the trial judge recuse himself from presiding over this 
case due to prior contact he had with appellant Belt. While 
the judge served as District Attorney for Salt Lake County, the 
County Attorney's Office prosecuted the following cases against 
Lynn Belt: 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen 
Jonas, Case No. 18935; Burglary and Theft; 
Arraignment July 21, 1964; Information was 
signed by Jay E. Banks. 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 19931; 
Burglary and Theft; Trial November 28, 1966 
to November 30, 1966; Information signed by 
Jay E. Banks. 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22074; 
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment February 2, 
1970; Information signed by Jay E. Banks. 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22535; 
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment June 15, 
1970; Information signed by Jay E. Banks. 
(R. 134-138, 141-143, 144-145) (See Adden-
dum C) 
On September 8, 1964, in Case No. 18935, in State of 
Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen Jonas, Judge Banks personally ap-
peared as the attorney for the State of Utah, at which time 
appellant Belt entered a plea of guilty to Second Degree 
Burglary. Belt was sentenced on September 21, 1964 to the Utah 
State Prison. This judgment and conviction was later set aside 
and reversed on a Writ of Habeaus Corpus filed in the United 
States District Court. In trying the case of a defendant which 
the judge had previously prosecuted, appellants submit that 
their due process rights were violated by the trial judge's 
refusal to recuse himself. 
The original trial date in the instant case was set 
for the 8th day of January, 1985. (R. 84) Because of the 
prior contact with the trial judge, appellant Belt filed an 
affidavit to recuse the judge on December 12, 1984. (R. 87-88) 
(Addendum D) The trial judge denied the motion and certified 
it to another district court judge to determine its sufficiency 
on December 14, 1984. (R. 88) On December 20, 1984, 18 days 
before trial, Judge Dean Conder reviewed the affidavit and 
denied the petition without hearing, concluding that there had 
not been enough evidence introduced to show bias and prejudice. 
(R. 85) The January trial was then postponed until April 2, 
1985. (R. 129) The original recusal motion was renewed before 
the April trial date and heard before Judge Phillip Fishier, 
who also denied the motion based on lack of timeliness and the 
prior decision of Judge Conder. (R. 133) (Addendum E) 
Addressing the timeliness issue raised by Judge 
Fishier, Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-29 (1982) states that a 
recusal motion must be filed "as soon as practicable." In 
other words, no specific time limit is imposed. Since this 
motion was first raised well before the original trial date, 
there should be no issue concerning lack of timeliness. Even 
if Judge Fishier ruled the second motion was not timely, 
certainly the original was timely, being filed 18 days before 
trial. 
This Court has had opportunity recently to define 
when disgualification of a judge should occur. In Anderson v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985), 
this Court stated that, "[0]ne of the fundamental principles of 
due process is that all parties to a case are entitled to an 
unbiased, impartial judge." In addition, this Court added, 
"[F]airness requires not only an absence of actual bias, but 
endeavors to prevent even the possibility of unfairness." Id. 
at 1221. (Emphasis added). 
In Anderson, the plaintiff had injured her knee while 
working. This injury required surgery and she applied to the 
Industrial Commission for worker's compensation benefits. 
After an unsuccessful operation, the plaintiff applied to the 
Industrial Commission for additional compensation for total 
disability. The original Administrative Law Judge ordered 
compensation for only thirteen weeks for temporary total dis-
ability. The plaintiff objected to this finding, claiming it 
was erroneous and the judge granted a further hearing. Before 
the hearing was held, the judge retired and was succeeded by 
Mr. Timothy Allen, who had been counsel for the insurance fund 
when the case was originally argued. After the hearing, Judge 
Allen issued an order reaffirming the previous order over 
plaintiff's objection. On appeal, this Court held that Judge 
Allen's failure to recuse himself constituted reversible error, 
stating: 
[W]hen a judge has previously been involved 
in a case as an attorney, there is no need 
to show actual prejudice. The law presumes 
prejudice in such circumstances. Judge 
Allen should have disqualified himself in 
this case." Id. at 1221 
In this case, as in Anderson, "fairness requires not 
only an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even 
the possibility of unfairness." In both cases, each judge 
acted improperly by trying a case after having acted as opposing 
counsel in litigation involvinq the parties before them. 
Because the judge in the instant case personally prosecuted 
appellant Belt, he should have disgualified himself as the 
trial judge. 
In U.S. v. Zerilli, 328 F. Supp. 706, 708 (CD. Calf. 
1971), the judge was reguired to disgualify himself even though 
it had been 30 years since he had prosecuted the defendant in a 
criminal case. The court stated the reason for reguiring him 
to be disgualified, was to avoid "the appearance of possible 
personal bias or prejudice." This case demonstrates that the 
passage of time does not cure a judge's possible bias or the 
appearance thereof. Therefore, even in cases such as in the 
instant case, where the original action occurred long ago, the 
trial judge should still disqualify himself. 
Because of a trial judge's prior involvement in an 
investigation of the defendant's hotel (though totally unrelated 
to the assault charge being tried), the Washington Supreme 
Court in State v. Madry, 8 Wash. 2061, 504 P.2d 1150, 1161 
(1972) ruled that a judge must not only be impartial, but must 
also have the appearance of impartiality. The reason is that 
" [T]he appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to 
public confidence in the administration of justice as would be 
the actual presence of bias or prejudice." (^d.* at 1161) 
The Colorado Court of Appeals has followed the well-
reasoned rule that a judge should be disgualified for even the 
appearance of a lack of impartiality. In Wood Bro. Homes Inc. 
v. City of Fort Collins, 670 P.2d 9 (Colo. App. 1983), the 
trial judge, prior to his appointment to the bench, had sat on 
the Planning and Zoning Commission which considered and reviewed 
the plot of land that formed the basis for the dispute. The 
motion to disqualify was denied by the judge on the basis that 
he had no recollection of plaintiff's matter before the Commis-
sion. 
The Court of Appeals stated, "While we find no evidence 
of partiality, we conclude that because of the trial judge's 
prior association with the Commission, one might reasonably 
question his impartiality so as to render it improper for him 
to have presided over the trial in this case." (I<i. at 10) 
The court ruled that the judge's position on the Planning 
Commission disqualified him from the case, even if the judge had 
said that he had no recollection of the prior matter. The court 
continued by saying, "Even if the judge's impartiality could 
not be reasonably questioned, we still have a situation which 
created the appearance of impropriety, which precludes the 
judge from sitting on this case." (Ld. at 10) Similarly, in 
the instant case, even if the trial judge's impartiality cannot 
reasonably be questioned, the situation creates the appearance 
of impropriety. 
The position taken by these courts is directly 
analogous to the Code of Judicial Conduct Cannon (3) (c) (1), 
which provides in part that " [A] judge should disqualify himself 
in a proceeding in which his partiality might reasonably be 
questioned..." The commentary to this section reiterates this 
viewpoint: "A judge formerly employed by a government agency 
...should disqualify himself in a proceeding if his impartiality 
might reasonably be Questioned because of such association." 
This position reaffirms the notion that even the appearance of 
unfairness is grounds for recusal. 
The law, as it has been set forth by this Court in 
Anderson, which is a position that is supported by the ABA and 
other case law in neighboring jurisdictions, mandates that the 
trial judge should have recused himself from the trial in the 
instant case. Even absent a showing of actual prejudice, and 
despite the lapse of time, his recusal was necessary to avoid 
the possibilty of judicial partiality. (Emphasis added) Accord-
ingly, appellant's convictions sould be reversed and remanded 
for a new trial before a different judge. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS WERE PREJUDICIALLY HARMED BECAUSE 
THEY DID NOT RECEIVE A COMPLETE COPY OF THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT. 
Appellants' preliminary hearing in the Fifth Circuit 
Court took place on May 18, 1983. Through some malfunctions in 
the recording equipment, they were prevented from receiving a 
complete copy of the preliminary hearing transcript. Counsel 
for the appellants filed a motion to remand the matter for a 
new preliminary hearing. (R. 89, 90) The motion was denied by 
the trial court without hearing and the case was set for trial. 
(R. 146) Appellants now claim that the court committed revers-
ible error in not remanding this case for a new preliminary 
hearing. The failure to provide a complete transcript violated 
their rights, therefore this case should be reversed and remand-
ed . 
Under Utah law the circuit courts are now courts of 
record and are required by statute to record the testimony at a 
preliminary hearing and transmit the same to the district court 
if a bind over is ordered. 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-4-12 in part states: 
A verbatim record of the proceedings before 
circuit courts shall be maintained by a 
certified shorthand reporter, suitable 
electronic recording devices, or other means 
approved by the judicial council, except 
when the judge dispenses with such a record 
in a particular case or a portion of the 
proceedings with respect to it. 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-7(d )(3) states: 
If the magistrate orders the defendant 
bound over to the district court, the 
magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-
over order and shall forthwith transmit to 
the clerk of the district court all pleadings 
and records made of the proceedings before 
the magistrate, including exhibits, record-
ings and the type-written transcript, if 
made, in the magistrate's court. 
Many courts have ruled that it is error to deny a 
defendant a complete preliminary hearing transcript. Some of 
these courts have ruled that this error is not prejudicial. 
See: State v. Scott, 11 Ariz. 68, 461 P.2d 712 (1969), People 
v. Camel, 59 111.2d 422, 322 N.E.2d 36, (1974). However, 
appellants submit that the better rule has been stated in a 
number of jurisdictions that have found reversible error where 
a defendant has been denied a complete transcript of his 
preliminary hearing. 
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals recognized a defendant's 
right to have a transcript of his preliminary hearing in Wright 
v. State, 505 P.2d 507, 511 (Okla. 1973). There, the court 
stated: 
Where due diligence is shown in an effort 
to acquire [the preliminary hearing 
transcript] and a showing to its need is 
made, it is prejudicial error to force a 
defendant to trial without a preliminary 
hearing transcript. 
In State v. Duffy, 35 Wis.2d 369, 151 N.W.2d 63, 
(1967) the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: 
In all felony prosecutions before a magis-
trate the reporter should be called in to 
report what transpires at each appearance 
of the accused or his counsel. 
In Gardner v. U.S. , 407 F.2d 1266, 1267, cert, denied, 
395 U.S. 911 (D.C. cir. 1969) the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia was faced with facts similar to 
those in the present case. In that case, the preliminary 
hearing was held without a court reporter. The appellants 
claimed prejudice because they were unable to impeach any 
witnesses with inconsistent statements they might have made at 
the preliminary hearing. On appeal the circuit court stated: 
Appellant had a right to a written transcript 
[of the preliminary hearing] upon request... 
denial of this right requires reversal of 
conviction if an accused was prejudiced. 
In Brooks v. Edwards, 396 F.Supp. 662, 665 (W.D.N.C. 
1974), the U.S. District Court of North Carolina, noting the 
importance of a preliminary hearing transcript, stated: 
It may well be that a transcript of a 
preliminary hearing is more important than 
a transcript of the trial itself; until 
convicted an accused is theoretically 
presumed innocent, and even small disadvant-
ages can be critical, whereas after the 
trial that presumption has been dispelled 
and the use of a trial transcript may be of 
far less value to the accused. 
In the instant case, appellants were not provided a 
complete transcript of the preliminary hearing. However, as 
noted above, some courts require that the lack of such a 
transcript result in prejudice to the defendant. Here, the 
lack of the transcript did result in prejudicial harm to 
appellants. The accomplice, David Bittner, admitted at trial 
that he had perjured himself at the preliminary hearing. (Tr. 
384) Although the point on which the perjury occurred seems 
slight (payment for testimony), it illustrated the greater harm 
caused by the lack of the preliminary hearing transcript. The 
lack of the transcript inhibited the cross-examination of 
Bittner by defense attorneys. The possibility of other incon-
sistencies could not be explored and placed before the jury. 
Bittner was a critical witness in this case and the lack of a 
preliminary hearing transcript immunized him from a successful 
cross-examination and deprived appellants of a full and fair 
hearing. 
Though it appears that this Court has not yet addressed 
this exact issue, its1 rulings are consistent with the better 
reasoned view that a defendant's rights are violated when he is 
not allowed a complete transcript of the preliminary hearing. 
In State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 782 (Utah 1980), this Court 
said: 
[T]he preliminary hearing represents a crit-
ical stage in the criminal process and a 
part of the criminal prosecution. 
In Utahf the preliminary hearing is more than a probable cause 
hearing. Two other purposes for the preliminary hearing men-
tioned specifically in Anderson are: 1) the preliminary hearing 
is a discovery device and 2) it preserves evidence for trial. 
(Id. at 784.) An incomplete transcript of the preliminary hear-
ing denies the defendant an opportunity to take advantage of 
these ancillary purposes of the preliminary hearing. Because 
of the important role the preliminary hearing plays in the 
criminal process, the appellants1 rights were violated by not 
allowing them a full transcript and record of the preliminary 
hearing. For the reasons stated above, this court should re-
verse and remand this case for a new preliminary hearing. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL TRES-
PASS. 
Defense counsel requested that an instruction be 
given to the jury on criminal trespass, a lesser included 
offense of burglary. The court refused this request, and 
appellants were convicted of burglary. (Tr. 553) 
The statutory test to determine whether one offense 
is the lesser included offense of another is articulated in 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-402 (1953 as amended); 
(3) ...An offense is... included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged. 
Numerous cases have dealt with a defendant's right to 
instructions on a lesser included offense. In a recent Utah 
Supreme Court case, State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), 
appellant was convicted of burglary. He appealed, claiming 
error in the court's refusal to instruct on the offense of 
criminal trespass. This Court reversed the conviction and 
discussed the importance of instructions on lesser included 
offenses. The court emphasized the benefit to the defendant in 
allowing the jury a less drastic alternative to convicting on 
the charged offense. 671 P.2d at 156 citing Beck v. Alabama, 
447 U.S. 625, 633, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2388 (1980). The court also 
recognized the danger that jurors are more likely to convict if 
no lesser instruction is given because of the belief that the 
defendant is guilty of some crime. Jki. at 156-57 citing Keeble 
v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-98 
(1973) . 
In Baker the court resolved much of the confusion 
which had previously existed regarding lesser included offenses, 
that is, whether a court should apply the "necessarily included 
offense" doctrine or an evidence-based analysis in determining 
when an instruction on a lesser included offense is warranted. 
The court then held that the "necessarily included offense" 
doctrine, the stricter of the two standards, applies only when 
it is the prosecutor seeking the instruction on a lesser included 
offense. But when it is the defendant who requests the instruc-
tion, an evidence-based analysis is employed. 
In State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 1984), this 
court, relying on State v. Baker, utilized the evidence-based 
analysis. In that case appellant had requested an instruction 
on the lesser included offense of assault. This request was 
denied, and he was convicted of aggravated kidnapping. The 
court held this to be error and analyzed the defense request 
based on the two-part test developed in Baker. The first prong 
of the test, the court noted, requires an overlap of the 
statutory elements of the two offenses. The second prong of 
the evidence-based standard requires the production of some 
evidence at trial that if believed by the jury, would allow for 
acquittal on the offense charged and conviction on the lesser 
offense. Idk at 589. 
Using the Baker and Brown analysis, the first prong 
requires a comparison of the statutory elements of the offense 
of which appellants were convicted, burglary, and the elements 
of the reguested lesser offense of criminal trespass. The 
pertinent statutory elements of criminal trespass are: 
U.C.A., 1953, §76-6-206(1). 
Criminal Trespass - (1) For purposes of 
this section "enter" means intrusion of the 
entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass 
if, under circumstances not amounting to 
burglary as defined in sections 76-6-202, 
76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on 
property and: 
(i) Intends to cause annoyance or 
injury to any person thereon or damage to 
any property thereon; or 
(ii) Intends to commit any crime, 
other than theft or a felony; 
(iii) Is reckless as to whether 
his presence will cause fear for the safety 
of another. 
The burglary statute proscribes the unlawful entry 
into a building with the intent to commit a felony or theft. 
(Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-202(1)) Criminal trespass proscribes 
an unlawful entry onto property with intent to cause annoyance 
or injury to that property. If the actor commits an unlawful 
entrance on property he or she can be guilty of either burglary 
or criminal trespass. Therefore, the statutes overlap and the 
determining factor becomes one of intent. The statutory overlap 
in the context of this case is direct. 
With regard to the second prong of the analysis, this 
Court, in State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980), enun-
ciated the test as follows: 
This Court mandates giving defendant's 
requested instructions on the lesser offense 
if "any evidence, however slight, on any 
reasonable theory of the case" might lead 
to conviction on the lesser included offense. 
Id. at 1232. 
In the instant case, the jurors, in reaching a verdict, 
were required to apply the facts to the legal instructions 
given them. Included in these instructions were the follow-
ing: 
A person commits burglary if he/she enters 
or remains unlawfully in a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft. 
A person enters or remains unlawfully in or 
upon premises when the premises or any 
portion thereof at the time of the entry or 
remaining are not open to the public and 
when the actor is not otherwise licensed or 
privileged to enter or remain upon the 
premises or such portion thereof. (R. 165) 
In applying the legal definition of an "unlawful 
entry" to the evidence, the jury may well have concluded that 
appellants were guilty of a criminal trespass rather than a 
burglary. Appellants testified that they had no intention 
of taking anything when they entered the building at Spectra 
Symbol. (R. 796) They both stated that David Bittner had told 
them he had authority to enter the building, (R. 726, 736, 776) 
because he was a foreman at Sectra Symbol. (R. 780, 779, 726) 
Appellants also testified that Bittner provided the front door 
key so they could enter. (R. 729, 780) Finally, they stated 
that their purpose for entering the building was to retrieve 
marijuana hidden in his locker. (R. 731, 775) This was to 
prevent Bittner1s parole officer from finding it on a search of 
the locker the next day. (R. 744) 
Clearly, the jury had a factual basis on which to 
conclude that the entry constituted criminal trespass and not a 
burglary. Because the lesser included charge instruction was 
not given, the jury was forced to decide between the two extremes 
of burglary or acguittal with no "middle ground" upon which to 
compromise. The reasonable choice the jury should have been 
given would be between, burglary, criminal trespass, or acguit-
tal. Because the trial court refused to instruct the jury on 
this lessor included charge, this case should be reversed and 
remanded to the district court. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
NOT GIVING THE JURY AN INSTRUCTION REGARDING 
ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY. 
Appellants' reauest for a cautionary instruction to 
the jury was denied. (R. 185) This proposed instruction was 
directed to the testimony of the accomplice, David Bittner. It 
read as follows? 
An accomplice is one who unites with another 
person in the commission of a crime, 
voluntarily and with common intent. An 
accomplice does not become incompetent as a 
witness because of participation in the 
crime charged. On the contrary, the 
testimony of one who asserts by his testimony 
that he is an accomplice, may be received 
in evidence and considered by the jury, 
even though not corroborated by other 
evidence, and given such weight as the jury 
feels it should have. The jury, however, 
should keep in mind that such testimony is 
always to be received with caution and 
considered with great care. 
You should never convict a defendant upon 
the unsupported testimony of an alleged 
accomplice, unless you believe that 
unsupported testimony beyond a reasonable 
doubt. (R. 185) 
The right to a cautionary instruction is covered by 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-17-7(2) which provides: 
In the discretion of the court, an instruc-
tion to the jury may be given to the effect 
that such uncorroborated testimony should 
be viewed with caution, and such an instruc-
tion shall be given if the trial judge 
finds the testimony of the accomplice to be 
self contradictory, uncertain or improb-
able. [Emphasis added]. 
Under this statute, the trial judge is given the 
discretion to determine whether to give a cautionary instruction 
or not. The premise on which the judge makes his or her decision 
is whether the accomplice's testimony is self contradictory, 
uncertain or improbable. Because the accomplice in the instant 
case testified at trial that he had perjured himself at the 
preliminary hearing, his testimony was clearly, by his own 
admission, self contradictory. (Tr. 384) These perjured re-
marks, along with testimony that directly conflicted with 
appellants1 testimony made David Bittnerfs testimony uncertain 
and improbable. (Tr. 323-386, R.707-736, 766-797) Because of 
the reasons stated, the jury should have been cautioned regard-
ing Bittner's testimony, as required by statute. This court 
can only overcome the mistake made by the trial court in one 
way - reverse and remand this case for a new trial with such a 
proper cautionary instruction. 
Courts usually follow the rule stated in the Utah 
statute that evidence from a witness whose self-interest or 
attitude may prompt testimony unfavorable to the accused should 
be considered with caution and great care. In Williamson v. 
U.S. , 477 F.2d 1309, 1 (5th Cir. 1964), the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals followed the rule that failure to admonish the jury 
to narrowly scrutinize the testimony of an accomplice is plain 
error. The Fifth Circuit followed this same reasoning in the 
more recent case of Tillery v. U.S. , 411 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 
1969) . 
The defendant and accomplice in Tillery were involved 
in a burglary. The accomplice as in the instant case, testified 
inconsistently. The Fifth Circuit stated: 
By failing to warn the jury about [accom-
plice's] reliability in this case, the 
trial court presented the evidence to the 
jury in an improper perspective and the 
jury may have felt bound to accept it as 
true. Id. at 648. 
The court reversed and remanded the appellant's conviction 
because the jury was not given the cautionary instruction. 
Courts in the surrounding jurisdictions have followed 
the same reasoning that a jury instruction should be given 
concerning the unreliability of an accomplice's testimony. See 
State v. Forsyth, 642 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Mont. 1982) ("[I]t is 
reguired that the jury be instructed by the court on all proper 
occasions that the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed 
with distrust."); State v. Pantee, 32 Or.App. 117, 573 P.2d 
751, 755 (1978), (The proper instruction to a jury was to view 
the testimony of an accomplice with distrust); State v. Carothers, 
84 Wash.2d 256, 525 P.2d 731, (1974) ("Far from being superfluous 
or objectionable, a cautionary instruction is mandatory if the 
prosecution relies upon the testimony of an accomplice.") 
Appellants contend that under the facts of this case 
the trial judge was reguired to give a cautionary instruction 
on accomplice's testimony. Reversal is the only way the appel-
lants can overcome the trial judge's abuse of his discretion in 
not allowing this instruction. This abuse of discretion is 
reversable error and should be held so by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the appel-
lants, George Ray Neeley and Lynn L. Belt, seek reversal of 
their convictions and remand of the cases to the district court 
with an order for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this j L \ day of January, 
1986. 
RONALD' J. YENGICH 
Attorney for Appell 
1/yfLVm BROWN n YNN OWAttorney for Defendant Belt 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed/delivered to the 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84114, on this day of January, 1986. 
Delivered this day of January, 1986 by: 
ADDENDUM 
A 
Section 13. [Disqualification of judges]. 
Except by consent of all the parties, no judge of the 
Supreme or inferior courts shall preside in the trial of any 
cause where either of the parties shall be connected with him 
by affinity or consauguinity within the degree of first counsin, 
or in which he "may have been of counsel, or in the trial of 
which he may have presided in any inferior court. 
B 
77-35-29. Rule 29 - Diability and disqualification 
of a judge or change of venue. 
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness or other disability, 
the judge before whom a trial has begun is unable to continue 
with the trial, any other judge of that court or any judge 
beinq so assigned by the chief judge of the judicial council, 
upon certifying that he has familiarized himself with the record 
of the trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with 
and finish the trial; but if the judge so assigned is satisfied 
that neither he nor another substitute judge can proceed with 
such trial, he may, in his discretion, grant a new trial. 
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness or other disability, 
the judge before whom a defendant has been tried is unable to 
perform the duties required of the court after a verdict of 
guilty, any other judge of that court or any judge being so 
assigned by the chief judge may perform those duties. 
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action 
or proceeding shall file an affidavit that the judge before 
whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a 
bias or prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or 
in favor of any opposing party to the suit, such judge shall 
proceed no further therein until the challenge is disposed of. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for 
the belief that such bias or prejudice exists and shall be 
filed as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned 
or such bias or prejudice is known. No such affidavit shall be 
filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record 
that such affidavit and application are made in good faith. 
(d) If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency of 
the allegation of disqualification, he shall enter an order 
directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another 
named judge of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, 
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the 
ADDENDUM CONTINUED 
B - §77-35-29. Rule 29 continued 
(d continued) 
allegations. If the challenged judge does not guestion the 
legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the 
affidavit is certified finds that it is leqally sufficient, 
another judge shall be called to try the case or to conduct the 
proceeding. If the judge to whom the affidavit is certified 
does not find the affidavit to be legally sufficient, he shall 
enter a finding to that effect and the challenged judge shall 
proceed with the case or proceeding. 
(e) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action 
believes that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the 
jurisdiction where the action is pending, either may, by motion, 
supported by an affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the 
trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction. 
If the court is satisfied that the representations made in 
the affidavit are true and justify transfer of the case, the 
court shall enter an order for the removal of the case to the 
court of another jurisdiction free from such objection and all 
records pertaining to the case shall be transferred forthwith 
to the court in such other county. If, based thereon, the 
court is not satisfied that the representations so made justify 
transfer of the case, the court shall either enter an order 
denying said transfer or order a formal hearing in court to 
resolve the matter and receive further evidence with respect to 
such alleged prejudice. 
(f) Whenever a change of judge or place of trial is ordered 
all documents of record concerning the case shall be transferred 
without delay to the judge who shall hear the case. 
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APR 2 19^ 5 LYNN R. BROWN (#4060) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
 H c^ xonHir»>i:v d ^ i ' *n -;.<«»' 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-v-
LYNN L. BELT and GEORGE 
RAY NEELY, 
Defendants 
S T I P U L A T I O N 
Case No. CR-83-823 
Judge Jay E. Banks 
It is hereby stipulated that the following information 
may be adopted by the Court as factually correct: 
That September 8, 1964 in Case No. 18935, in State of 
Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen Jonas, Jay Elmer Banks personally 
appeared as the attorney for the State of Utah, at which time 
LYNN L. BELT entered a plea of guilty to second degree burglary. 
LYNN L. BELT v/as sentenced on September 21, 1964 to the Utah State 
Prison. This judgment and conviction was later set aside and 
reversed on a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the United States 
District Court. Belt v. Turner, Case No. 140-71. 
DATED this ", I day of March, 1985 
•< I 
l I: i 
/ i ih. : I 
RICHARD SHEPHERD / 
Deputy County Attorney 
DATED this 2.0 day of March, 1985. 
24u 
RON YENGICH 
Attorney for Defe. 
DATED this s,~ day of March, 1985. 
_ -
 ?
 ) 
'LYNN R. BRCHJN 
Attorney for Defendant Belt 
DELIVERED/IiAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this Jj__ day of March, 1985. 
likili hfi.n 
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LYNN R. BROWN (#0460) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5 444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : A F F I D A V I T 
P l a i n t i f f 
- v - : 
LYNN L. BELT, : Case No .-€£8-3-823 
Judge Jay E. Banks 
Defendant : 
I, LYNN L. BELT, being first duly sworn according 
to lav; on my oath do depose and say: 
1. That I am the defendant, LYNN L. BELT, in the 
case of State of Utah v. George Ray Neely and Lynn L. Belt, 
Case No. CR83-823, which is set for trial on January 8, 1985 
before the Honorable Jay E. Banks. 
2. That between the years of 1964 and 1972 the 
following felony cases against the affiant were prosecuted 
through the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office, during 
the time the Honorable Judge Jay E. Banks was the elected 
District Attorney and was also personally involved in some of 
2 • TO 
'**• , fan 
I 
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these cases at various stages of the proceedings: 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen Jonas, 
Case No, 13935; Burglary and Theft; Arraignment 
July 21f 1964; Information was signed by Jay 
E. Banks. 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 19931; 
Burglary and Theft; Trial November 28, 1966 
to November 30, 1966; Information signed by 
Jay E. Banks. 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22074; 
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment February 2, 1970; 
Information signed by Jay E. Banks. 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22535 
Burglary and Theft, Arraignment June 15, 1970; 
Information signed by Jay E. Banks. 
3. That because of the above prosecutions against 
the affiant through the District Attorney!s Office it is 
my belief that the Honorable Jay E. Banks is legally biased 
or prejudiced against me and should not conduct the trial 
set for January 8, 1935 and should appoint another Judge 
as provided in 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this /^~^ day of December, 19 84. 
LYNN <£. BELT , 
rr/l) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this J ^ day 
of tiMUllm ) . 1984 
NOTARY PUBLIC /y 
Residing in Salt(j£ake County 
My Commission Expires: , , v . ^ ^  ^f*/* A**>«-«-< 
— — — </' xJ <L/ U*<"* hL C 
i-nxn r-1 r* *" ' 
Salt U>' ^ l ' '* 
LYNN R. BR0T.7N (#0460) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
Plaintiff : 
-v- : 
LYNN L. BELT, : Case No. CR-83-823 
Defendant : 
FACTS 
LYNN L. BELT is the defendant in the case of State of 
Utah v, George Ray Neely and Lynn L. Belt, Case No. CR-83-823, 
v/hich is set for trial April 2, 1985 before the Honorable Jay 
E. Banks. Between 1964 and 1972, the Salt Lake County District 
Attorney's Office prosecuted the following four felony cases 
against Mr. Belt: 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen Jonas, 
Case No. 18935; Burglary and Theft; Arraianment 
July 21, 1964; Information was signed by Jay E. 
Banks. 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 19931; 
Burglary and Theft; Trial November 28, 1966 
to November 30, 1966; Information signed by 
Jay E. Banks. 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22074; 
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment February 2, 1970; 
Information signed by Jay E. Banks. 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22535; 
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment June 15, 1970; 
Information signed by Jay E. Banks. 
During that time the Honorable Judge Jay E. Banks was elected 
District Attorney and was personally involved in some of these 
cases. 
In Case No. 18935, State of Utah v. Lynn Belt and 
Gaylen Jonas, Jay Elmer Banks personally appeared September 8, 
1964 representing the State. Mr. Belt entered a plea of guilty 
to second degree burglary in the case and was sentenced 
September 21, 1964 to the Utah State Prison. This judgment 
and conviction was later set aside and reversed on a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus filed in the United State District Court. Belt 
v. Turner, Case No. 140-71. 
ISSUE 
THE JUDGE WHO WAS COUNSEL FOR THE STATE IN ANOTHER 
CASE AGAINST MOVANT IS DISQUALIFIED FROM PRESIDING 
AT THE TRIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution 
specifically provides for disqualification of the presiding 
judge where the judge "may have been of counsel" at an earlier 
date. (Appendix A). 
The same protection against biased judges is also 
recognized in Utah's Code of Criminal Procedure. Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-29(c), Rule 29 (1982 as amended). (Appendix A). The bias 
may be either against a party or in favor of the opposing party according 
to the statute. The Rule mandates the judge proceed no further once an 
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affidavit alledging bias or prejudice is filed. Another judge must 
either try the case or conduct the hearing. 
Mr. Belt has only found one Utah case where the sitting 
trial judge had previously been a deputy in the County Attorney's 
Office which was investigating the beliefs and practices of 
polygamous marriage, the same matter which the petitioner was 
being tried for. The petitioner's affidavit alleged his prosecution 
for conspiracy to advise and practice polygamous marriages resulted 
directly from the investigations conducted by the County Attorneyfs 
Office. Musser v. Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
106 Ut. 373, 148 P.2d 802 (1944). The Court reasoned because the 
alleged prejudice was founded on the religious beliefs of the 
judge, a reason not specifically set forth in the statute for 
disqualification, the matter was left entirely within the discretion 
of the trial court. For this reason, even through the same judge 
had previously ruled against the petitioners for unlawful cohabitation, 
the judgefs decision not to disqualify himself was not disturbed on 
appeal. The statute now requires the judge receiving the affidavit 
to have that matter heard by another judge. Utah Code Ann. §77-35-29 
(1982 as amended), Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 
(1962) . 
Even though the Musser decision is now outdated, some 
of its language reflects the newer more liberal policy contemplated 
by Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 13 and Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-29 (1982 as amended). The Court admitted it might have been 
"better that a fresh mind sit on the latter case.11 148 P. 2d at 803. 
-3- ,., 
A few years later the Utah Supreme Court again considered 
the question of bias or prejudice as the part of the judge. In 
Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520 (1948) the Court 
found actual bias or prejudice in the part of the judge disqualifies 
him. Although the affidavit in Haslam v. Morrison was found to 
be insufficient to support the allegation, the Court took a very 
strong position commending disqualification whenever an affidavit 
alleges bias. The Court further found disqualification was the 
general practice in Utah whenever an affidavit of bias has been 
filed. 190 P. 2d at 523. The Court stated "[t]he purity and 
integrity of the judicial process ought to be protected against 
any taint of suspicion to the end that the public and litigants 
may have the highest confidence in the integrity and fairness 
of the courts." Id. 
Justice Wade's concurring opinion noted the danger of 
a biased judge being tempted to hold falsely he is not biased. 
Justice Wade further commented that even if the judge is not 
biased but where a party believes he is, there is no reason another 
judge should not be called in to try the case since the result 
should be the same, 190 P.2d at 526. The importance of a fair 
and impartial trial and the importance of the public's "absolute 
confidence in the integrity of the courts" clearly support the 
"almost universal practice...to get another judge even on the 
mere suggestion of a party...that the judge was biased or prejudiced." 
Id. 
Under the terms of the Utah Constitution and the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judge in the present case should 
be disqualified. Here, there is r\ore than the mere possibility 
of personal bias where the judge, in his previous capacity as 
a prosecuting attorney conducted a criminal case against Mr. 
Belt as in the case of United States v. Zerilli, 328 F. Supp. 706 
(CD. Cal. 1971) . The Judge should be required to disqualify 
himself as in Zerilli, though in Zerilli the judge had prosecuted 
one of the defendants thirty years earlier. Mr. Belt's right 
to a fair and impartial trial mandate nothing less than dis-
qualification of Judge Jay E. Banks in the case at bar. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jf day of April, 1985. 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this <( day of April, 1985. 
ADDENDUM D 
LYNN R. BROWN (#0460) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
APR 2 ft*, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-v-
LYNN L. BELTf 
Defendant 
A M E N D E D 
A F F I D A V I T 
Case No. CR-83-823 
Judge Jay E. Banks 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, LYNN L. BELT, being first duly sworn according to 
law on my oath do depose and say: 
1. That I am the defendant, LYNN L. BELT, in the 
case of State of Utah v. George Ray Neely and Lynn L. Belt, 
Case No. CR-83-823, which is set for trial on April 2, 1985 
before the Honorable Jay E. Banks. 
2. That between the years of 1964 and 1972 the 
following felony cases against the affiant were prosecuted 
through the Salt Lake County District Attorney's office. 
During that time the Honorable Judge Jay E. Banks was elected 
District Attorney. He was also personally involved in some of 
these cases at various stages of the proceedings: 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen Jonas, 
Case No. 18935; Burglary and Theft; Arraignment 
July 21, 1964; Information was signed by Jay E. 
Banks . 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 19931; 
Burglary and Theft; Trial November 28, 1966 
to November 30, 1966; Information signed by 
Jay E. Banks. 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22074; 
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment February 2, 1970; 
Information signed by Jay E. Banks. 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22535; 
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment June 15, 1970; 
Information signed by Jay E. Banks. 
3. That September 8, 1964 in Case No. 18935, in 
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen Jonas, Jay Elmer Banks 
personally appeared as the attorney for the State of Utah, at 
which time LYNN L. BELT entered a plea of guilty to second 
degree burglary. LYNN L. BELT was sentenced on September 21, 1964 
to the Utah State Prison. This judgment and conviction was later 
set aside and reversed on a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the 
United States District Court. Belt v. Turner, Case No. 140-71. 
This information has been verified via telephone conversation with 
Ms. Andrea Joo at United States Clerk's office in Denver, Colorado 
and the records at the Salt Lake County Attorney's office. 
4. That because of the above prosecutions against 
the affiant through the District Attorney's office, it is 
my belief that the Honorable Jay E. Banks is legally biased 
or prejudiced against me and should not conduct the trial set 
for April 2, 1985, and should appoint another Judge as provided 
-2-
in 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
DATED this %'f day of March, 1985. 
(A ..iVHr*^ 
LYN8J L. BELT 
rf fisAi-/-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this Q') day of 
March, 1985. 
l\ni\U(i'lh\i{^i'lYA 
My Commission Expires: NOTARY PUBLIC /] 
-x^-%% Residing ln: A,it W-t hwdi 
y ' / Art** ' j A > ^ V 
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ADDENDUM E 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
F l l p N n CR 8 3 - 8 2 3 
TITLE: (*> PARTIES PRESENT) 
STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
LYNN L . BELT N / P 
e+ 
COUNSEL: (• COUNSEL PRESENT) 
: RICHARD SHEPHERD X 
LYNN BROWN X 
. RONALD YENGICH X 
KATHY GROTEPAS 
JULIE CLEGG 
GENE UNSWORTH 
CLERK 
REPORTER 
BAILIFF 
HON. PHILIP FISHLER 
DATE: APRIL 1, 1985 
JLU 
Defendant's motion to disqualify Judge Banks from this case 
comes now before the Court for hearing. Appearances as shown above. 
Based upon arguments, the Court takes the matter under advisement, 
and will advise counsel later on this same day as to the Court's rulinc 
The Court now being informed, denies defendant's motion to dis-
qualify Judge Banks for the following reasons: 
1. The motion was not filed timely. 
2. The motion was ruled upon by Judge Conder who was then 
the presiding Judge. The motion was denied by Judge Conder. The 
facts before Judge Conder were substantially the same facts brought 
to this Court's attention except that it is now asserted that one of 
defendant Belt's earlier convictions was overturned. In considering 
this portion of the affidavit, this Court finds that it is legally 
insufficient in light of Judge Conder's earlier ruling. 
Counsel called April 1, 1985 by Kathy Grotepas and Pat Jones JL33 
PAGE. _OF_ 
